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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
  Michelle Moody sued the Atlantic City Board of 
Education (“Board”) for sexual harassment and retaliation 
pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 3(a), and the 
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”), N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 10:5-12(a), (d).  The District Court granted 
summary judgment to the Board, finding that the alleged 
harasser, Maurice Marshall, was not Moody’s supervisor.  
Because Marshall was empowered to determine whether 
Moody worked at New York Avenue School, which had a 
direct impact on her pay, and the record reveals no one else 
provided supervision, the District Court erred in concluding 
Marshall was not her supervisor.  In addition, because there are 
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disputed facts concerning whether Moody sustained a tangible 
employment action, and because the Board’s defense rests in 
part on the resolution of this issue, the District Court 
prematurely considered the availability of the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense.  See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
(1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  
Therefore, we will vacate and remand.  
 
I1 
 
 In November 2011, the Board approved Moody’s hiring 
as a substitute custodian.  As a substitute custodian, Moody 
filled in for full-time custodians but was not guaranteed any 
work.  During the 2011-2012 school year, Moody was rarely 
scheduled to work and in the summer of 2012, she asked a 
Board employee how to obtain more work.  The employee 
suggested that Moody introduce herself to the custodial 
foremen at the schools within the district.  Each school had a 
custodial foreman who was delegated the authority to select 
which substitute custodians worked at the school.   
 
 Around September 2012, Moody introduced herself to 
approximately ten custodial foremen at different schools, 
including Marshall, the custodial foreman at New York 
Avenue School.  By October 2012, Marshall was assigning 
Moody regular work.  Moody also met the custodial foreman 
at Pennsylvania Avenue School and occasionally worked 
there.  The Board concedes that when Moody was working at 
                                              
1 Because we are reviewing a summary judgment 
record, we view the facts and make all reasonable inferences 
in Moody’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 
F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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New York Avenue School, Marshall was acting in a 
supervisory capacity.  Oral Argument at 18:07-18:30, Moody 
v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ. (3d Cir. July 12, 2017) (No. 16-4373), 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings 
(counsel for the Board stating that “it’s reasonable that if 
Moody was called in by Marshall that day, and Marshall was 
the foreman at the school in charge of all the custodians, I think 
that it’s reasonable that during that day he could be considered 
[to be] in a supervisory position”).  The record does not 
indicate that anyone other than Marshall supervised Moody’s 
work at New York Avenue School. 
 
 Moody claims that, around the end of October 2012, 
Marshall began making sexual comments to her and told her 
that he would assign her more hours if she performed sexual 
favors for him.  According to Moody, Marshall “would often 
be very touch feely and grab [Moody’s] breasts or buttocks at 
the work place.”  App. 123.  Moody testified that: (1) in early 
November 2012, Marshall called Moody into his office and 
tried to remove her shirt; (2) in late November, Marshall called 
Moody into his office, where Moody found Marshall sitting 
unclothed on his office chair; and (3) in December 2012, 
Marshall grabbed Moody, pulled her towards him, and stated 
“[y]ou want more hours?”  App. 216.  On December 27, 2012, 
Marshall and Moody exchanged the following text messages: 
 
[Marshall:] U playing 
[Marshall:] Well 
[Marshall:] Ok ill hit u when I go to work 
[Moody:] In the am? 
[Marshall:] No tonight my other job am I getting 
all three holes 
[Moody:] No the hell u not 
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[Marshall:] How’s penn treating u 
[Marshall:] U got steady work and that’s where 
the contracts going to be at 
[Marshall:] I got u 
 
App. 127-28.  Moody interpreted these text messages to mean 
that Marshall could help her obtain a full-time contract to work 
at Pennsylvania Avenue School if she acquiesced to his sexual 
advances.  Moody said that Marshall came to Moody’s house 
that evening and told her that she would get an employment 
contract if she had sex with him.  Marshall grabbed her and 
began to kiss her.  Moody “felt that [her] job had been 
threatened,” and therefore she gave into Marshall’s unwelcome 
advances and reluctantly had sex with him.  App. 217.  In the 
days following this encounter, Moody told Marshall that it 
would never happen again.   
 
 Despite her rebuke, Moody received assignments at 
New York Avenue School on December 30, 2012 and January 
4, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, and 22, 2013.  Moody, however, believed 
that Marshall treated her differently after she rejected him.  On 
January 23, 2013, for example, Moody went to New York 
Avenue School to pick up her paycheck from Marshall.  At the 
time, Marshall was playing ping pong and would not retrieve 
the check for her until he finished the game.  Moody also 
noticed that Michelle McArthur, a new female substitute 
custodian, appeared to be receiving hours instead of her.2  
Further, another custodian told Moody that she was on 
                                              
2 The payroll records in fact show that, in January 2013, 
Moody received no hours at New York Avenue School after 
January 22 and that McArthur received work on January 23, 
24, 25, 28, and 29.   
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Marshall’s “shit list.”3  App. 119.  Later that day, Marshall and 
Moody exchanged the following text messages: 
 
[Moody:] U don’t gotta act like that towards me, 
I understand your upset at me but, outside of that 
Im a good worker, but, Its cool 
[Marshall:] Wt are u talking about, I’m not into 
the drama 
[Moody:] Just making sure Im not on ya so call 
“shit list” 
[Marshall:] U are but not like that I won’t stop u 
from getting I don’t play games like that 
 
App. 131.  Moody believed that Marshall delayed retrieving 
her paycheck and reduced her hours because she had rejected 
his sexual advances, and she exchanged more text messages 
with Marshall to that effect on January 29, 2013.  In these 
exchanges, Marshall seemed to deny having sex with Moody 
and asserted that Moody just said this because she was angry 
that he delayed retrieving her check.  Moody retorted “I have 
all the text messages and my parents saw u when u came to my 
house.”  App. 135.4   
 
 On February 4, 2013, Moody met with Sherry Yahn, the 
Board’s Assistant Superintendent, and informed Yahn that 
Marshall had been sexually harassing her.  Yahn immediately 
                                              
 3 The custodian to whom Moody attributed this 
comment denied making it. 
4 During his deposition, Marshall denied sexually 
harassing Moody.  In addition, eight custodians at New York 
Avenue School stated that they had not witnessed any 
inappropriate behavior on the part of Marshall or Moody.     
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took Moody to Human Resources (“HR”) to file a written 
complaint.  HR subsequently began an investigation into 
Moody’s complaint and ordered Moody and Marshall not to 
have contact with each other during the investigation.5   
 
 HR’s March 2013 report of its investigation states that 
it interviewed Moody, Marshall, and eight custodians at New 
York Avenue School, but it did not reach a conclusion as to 
whether Moody was sexually harassed.  Later that month, 
Moody filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.   
 
 The Board hired an outside law firm to conduct an 
independent investigation of Moody’s claims.  After 
considering the HR report and conducting further interviews, 
the firm issued a report in July 2013 finding that Moody was 
not subjected to sexual harassment or discrimination.  The 
Board informed Moody of these findings but nonetheless 
ordered Marshall and Moody to avoid any contact with each 
other.   
 
 Moody filed a complaint against the Board in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, raising 
claims of sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title 
                                              
5 Moody’s hours decreased in the months after she 
complained about Marshall. Compare App. 181-82 (showing 
that Moody was assigned to work 62 hours in October 2012, 
115.5 hours in November 2012, 126.5 hours in December 
2012, and 56 hours in January 2013), with App. 182 (showing 
that Moody was assigned to work 36 hours in February 2013, 
23 hours in March 2013, 32.5 hours in April 2013, and 24 hours 
in May 2013).     
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VII and the NJLAD.  Moody alleged that the Board subjected 
her to sexual harassment through Marshall and retaliated 
against her for complaining about the harassment.6  The 
District Court found that Marshall was not Moody’s supervisor 
and so the Board was not liable for his actions and, in any 
event, Moody did not show she suffered a tangible 
employment action.  The District Court also found that because 
the Board took prompt action upon receipt of her complaint, it 
was entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense.  As a 
result, the District Court granted summary judgment in the 
Board’s favor.  Moody appeals. 
 
II7 
 
We must decide whether the District Court erred by 
granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment on 
Moody’s sexual harassment and retaliation claims.  Our review 
of the District Court’s order granting summary judgment is 
plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 
413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same standard as the 
District Court, viewing facts and making all reasonable 
inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. 
Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A dispute 
“is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on 
                                              
6 Moody initially alleged that the Board retaliated 
against her by transferring her children to different schools, but 
she has since abandoned that theory.     
7 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, 
and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the 
outcome of the suit under governing law.”  Kaucher v. County 
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson 
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  The moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-
moving party fails to make “a sufficient showing on an 
essential element of her case with respect to which she has the 
burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 
(1986).   
 
III 
 
A 
 
 Title VII and the NJLAD prohibit sexual harassment 
because it is a form of sex discrimination.8  Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986); Lehmann v. Toys 
‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993).9  At oral argument, 
                                              
8 Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer “to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s . . . sex.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1).  Under the NJLAD, it is unlawful “[f]or an employer, 
because of the . . . sex . . . of any individual . . . to discriminate 
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions 
or privileges of employment.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(a).  
9 The New Jersey Supreme Court “has frequently 
looked to federal precedent governing Title VII” to interpret 
and apply the NJLAD.  Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 
A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993).   
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Moody stated that she is proceeding based upon a hostile work 
environment theory of sexual harassment.10   
 
 “To succeed on a hostile work environment claim 
[against the employer], the plaintiff must establish that 1) the 
employee suffered intentional discrimination because of 
his/her sex, 2) the discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) 
the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, 4) the 
discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person 
in like circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat 
superior liability.”  Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 
F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also 
Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 453 (setting forth elements of a hostile 
work environment claim under the NJLAD).11   
                                              
10 A plaintiff may also bring a sexual harassment claim 
pursuant to a “quid pro quo” theory.  See Lehmann, 626 A.2d 
at 452 (explaining that quid pro quo sexual harassment 
“involves an implicit or explicit threat that if the employee does 
not accede to the sexual demands, he or she will lose his or her 
job, receive unfavorable performance reviews, be passed over 
for promotions, or suffer other adverse employment 
consequences”). 
11 In Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., we left open the 
question of whether the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), 
would apply in the context of a quid pro quo sexual harassment 
claim, and we have not yet spoken on whether the framework 
would apply to hostile work environment claims.  206 F.3d 
271, 286 n.11 (3d Cir. 2000).  Under McDonnell Douglas, once 
a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination that 
resulted in an adverse employment action, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to show there was a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
11 
 
 Viewed in a light most favorable to her, Moody’s 
testimony about Marshall’s sexual actions and his comments 
                                              
reason for the adverse employment action.  411 U.S. at 802.  If 
the defendant can articulate such a reason, the plaintiff is 
afforded an opportunity to show the reason is pretextual.  Id. at 
804-05.  Some of our sister circuits have concluded that the 
McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply in hostile work 
environment sexual harassment cases.  See Pollard v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours Co., 213 F.3d 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that the McDonnell Douglas framework cannot 
apply to a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim 
because “there is no legitimate justification for such an 
environment, and thus recourse to the McDonnell Douglas test 
is not warranted”), rev’d on other grounds, 532 U.S. 843 
(2001); Martin v. Nannie & The Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 
1417 n.8 (10th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the plaintiff’s 
failure to rebut the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for her termination was not relevant to a hostile work 
environment claim), overruled on other grounds by Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); see also 
Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 
501, 510–11 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the district court 
erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to non-
retaliation sexual harassment claims, and explaining that the 
Ellerth Court made no mention of McDonnell Douglas and that 
sexual harassment cases have developed separately from other 
claims under Title VII).  We agree that the burden-shifting 
framework is inapplicable here because, as the Pollard court 
explained, there can be no legitimate justification for a hostile 
work environment.  213 F.3d at 943.  Therefore, we will not 
apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to 
Moody’s hostile work environment claim. 
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about her body supports her claim that Marshall’s harassment 
occurred “because of [Moody’s] sex.”  See Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The 
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving 
sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or 
sexual derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be 
recognized as a matter of course.”), superseded in part by 
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 
Stat. 1072; Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 454 (“When the harassing 
conduct is sexual or sexist in nature, the but-for element will 
automatically be satisfied.  Thus when a plaintiff alleges that 
she has been subjected to sexual touchings or comments . . . 
she has established that the harassment occurred because of her 
sex.”).   
 
 Viewed from the same perspective, Marshall’s conduct 
toward Moody, if proven, could be viewed by a reasonable 
juror as sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to support a hostile 
work environment claim.  The “severe or pervasive” standard 
requires conduct that is sufficient “to alter the conditions of 
[the employee’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”12  Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citation and internal 
                                              
12 The “severe or pervasive” standard is disjunctive and 
so “a plaintiff need not show that her hostile working 
environment was both severe and pervasive; only that it was 
sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive, or a sufficient 
combination of these elements, to have altered her working 
conditions.”  Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 
F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted); see also 
Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(clarifying that “[t]he correct standard is severe or pervasive” 
and explaining that “severity and pervasiveness are alternative 
13 
 
quotation marks omitted).  The question of “whether an 
environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive must be judged 
by looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.”  Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270-71 (2001) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Moody testified that, in addition to the times Marshall 
made sexually charged comments to her and grabbed her, 
Marshall once called her into his office and, when she entered, 
she found Marshall sitting naked on a chair.  On another 
occasion, Marshall allegedly called Moody into his office and 
attempted to take her shirt off.  At another point, Marshall sent 
her a text message stating “am I getting all three holes” and 
thereafter showed up at her house uninvited and pressured her 
into having sex with him by threatening her job.  App. 127; cf. 
Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Requiring an employee to engage in unwanted sex acts is one 
of the most pernicious and oppressive forms of sexual 
harassment that can occur in the workplace.”).  Although 
                                              
possibilities: some harassment may be severe enough to 
contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less 
objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace only if 
it is pervasive” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 455 (explaining that the 
severe or pervasive test is “disjunctive” and “[t]he required 
showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct 
varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the 
conduct” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Marshall denies this conduct, we must view the facts in 
Moody’s favor.  Hugh, 418 F.3d at 266-67.  From this 
perspective, Moody’s account provides sufficient evidence 
upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that she 
experienced severe harassment, and their different accounts of 
these events present disputed material facts for a jury to 
resolve.   
 
 Moody’s account, if proven, could also provide a basis 
from which a reasonable juror could infer that Marshall’s 
conduct detrimentally affected Moody and would have 
affected a reasonable person in similar circumstances.  
Moody’s testimony suggests that she “subjectively perceive[d] 
the environment to be abusive.”  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).  She testified that she believed 
Marshall expected to trade sexual favors for work and would 
seek retribution if she did not accede to his demands, and that 
he made her uncomfortable when he grabbed her and when he 
invited her to his office while he was unclothed.  A reasonable 
person would likely also find such an environment “objectively 
hostile or abusive,” id., because it is one where a perceived 
supervisor expected his subordinate to give sexual favors in 
exchange for work, touched a subordinate against her wishes, 
made sexual comments to her, and exposed himself to her. 
 
 Finally, since Moody sued the Board and not Marshall, 
we must consider whether there are disputed facts concerning 
the existence of respondeat superior liability.  On this point, we 
look to agency principles and the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 219 for guidance.13  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 755-58.  In 
                                              
 13 Section 219 of the Restatement provides:  
15 
 
discussing § 219(1), the Ellerth Court observed that “[t]he 
general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not 
conduct within the scope of employment” but that, under 
§ 219(2), “[i]n limited circumstances, agency principles 
impose liability on employers even where employees commit 
torts outside the scope of employment.”  Id. at 757-58.  Most 
relevant here, under § 219(2)(d), a master may be subject to 
liability even when employees act outside the scope of their 
employment if they were “aided in accomplishing the tort by 
the existence of the agency relation.”  Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 219(2)(d) (Am. Law Inst. 1958).   
 
 This “aided-in-the-accomplishment rule” can impose 
liability on employers for a supervisor’s harassment.  Liability 
                                              
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of 
his servants committed while acting in the scope 
of their employment. 
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts 
of his servants acting outside the scope of their 
employment, unless: 
(a) the master intended the conduct or the 
consequences, or 
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or 
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty 
of the master, or 
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on 
behalf of the principal and there was reliance 
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation.  
 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219 (Am. Law Inst. 1958).   
16 
 
here is predicated upon the idea that the supervisor is able to 
take an employment action only because he or she is the 
employer’s agent.  Thus, “[w]hen a supervisor takes a tangible 
employment action” against a subordinate, the employer is 
vicariously liable because “the injury could not have been 
inflicted absent the agency relation.”  Vance v. Ball State 
Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2442 (2013) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also id. (noting that a supervisor, 
as opposed to a co-worker, is in a sense always “aided by the 
agency relation” because “a supervisor’s power and authority 
invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular 
threatening character”).  An employee is a supervisor for 
purposes of respondeat superior liability pursuant to Title VII 
if he or she is “empowered by the employer to take tangible 
employment actions.”  Id. at 2439.  A “tangible employment 
action” is “a significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. 
 
 There is no dispute that Marshall had the authority to 
decide whether to summon Moody to work at New York 
Avenue School because the Board granted him that authority 
as the custodial foreman.  In fact, a Board employee suggested 
that Moody introduce herself to the custodial foremen as a 
means to obtain work assignments.14  The authority to assign 
                                              
14 While the District Court and the Board are correct that 
Marshall was only one of multiple custodial foremen within 
the school district who could have assigned Moody work, we 
are aware of no authority indicating that an employee cannot 
have multiple supervisors.  Such a rule would lead to the absurd 
result that employees with multiple managers have no 
17 
 
work is a “tangible employment action” because it is a decision 
that can “inflict[] direct economic harm,” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 
762, by “causing a significant change in benefits,” Vance, 133 
S. Ct. at 2443.  Given Marshall’s power as a custodial foreman 
to even allow Moody to work, he could effect a “tangible 
employment action” by setting her hours and hence her pay.  
See Cotton v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 
1227, 1231 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A reduction in an employee’s 
hours, which reduces the employee’s take-home pay, qualifies 
as a tangible employment action.”).  Marshall therefore had 
more than the power to direct Moody’s work or to have her 
stay beyond her shift or cover an extra shift.  He had the 
authority to determine whether Moody worked at all if he 
needed a substitute custodian.  Marshall could avoid calling 
Moody into work if he chose; and in fact he did so on multiple 
occasions when a substitute custodian was needed at New York 
Avenue School.  See App. 168, 171 (suggesting that Marshall 
called Michelle McArthur in to work on January 23–25 and 
28–29 instead of Moody).  Marshall had the authority to cause 
a significant change in Moody’s benefits by assigning her no 
                                              
“supervisors” for the purposes of Title VII and the NJLAD.  
Moreover, the fact that Marshall was unable to hire or fire 
employees is not dispositive of whether he is a supervisor.  As 
we have explained, an employee capable of effecting a 
“tangible employment action” is a supervisor, Vance v. Ball 
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013), and the concept of 
a tangible employment action extends beyond hiring and firing 
to decisions “causing a significant change in benefits,” 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998), 
such as reduced work hours for an hourly worker, Cotton v. 
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227, 1231 
(11th Cir. 2006).     
18 
 
hours, thereby eliminating her take-home pay. Thus, 
Marshall’s power to impact Moody’s earnings is sufficient to 
qualify him as a supervisor.  See Cotton, 434 F.3d at 1231.  
Moreover, the Board conceded that while Moody was working 
at New York Avenue School, Marshall was acting in a 
supervisory capacity.  Oral Argument at 18:07-18:30, Moody 
v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ. (3d Cir. July 12, 2017) (No. 16-4373), 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings.  
Furthermore, no one else was identified in the record as having 
authority over Moody, other than the custodial foremen who 
could assign her work at their schools.  While other foremen 
also could have arguably been Moody’s supervisors, Marshall 
assigned Moody over 70% of her hours from October 2012 
through February 2013.15   
 
 In summary, the record here supports the conclusion 
that Marshall was Moody’s supervisor because (a) the Board 
empowered him as the custodial foreman to select from the list 
of substitute custodians who could actually work at New York 
Avenue School;16  (b) the Board conceded that while Moody 
                                              
15 The Dissent suggests that, by considering the payroll 
records, the Majority is reverting to a pre-Vance rule for 
determining who is a supervisor.  This is not the case.  We are 
simply using the records to corroborate the conclusion that 
Marshall controlled a sizeable amount of Moody’s work, and 
hence her compensation—the benefit she received from her 
employment. 
16 This is not to say that every employee tasked with 
creating a work schedule is a supervisor for Title VII and 
NJLAD purposes.  See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2448 (“The ability 
to direct another employee’s tasks is simply not sufficient.”).  
The Dissent cites to not precedential opinions of other circuits 
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was on school premises, Marshall served in a supervisory role; 
(c) the record identifies no other person who was present full 
time or even sporadically on the school’s premises, or 
anywhere for that matter, who served as Moody’s supervisor; 
and (d) since Moody’s primary benefit from her employment 
was hourly compensation, and since Marshall controlled 70% 
of her hours, his decision to assign or withhold hours 
significantly affected her pay.17  Thus, the record shows that 
Marshall was Moody’s supervisor, as defined under Vance, for 
whose conduct the Board may be liable.18 
                                              
discussing nonsupervisory employees, but we are bound by our 
precedent and our custom not to rely on not precedential 
opinions of our Court and, by extension, those of our sister 
circuits.  See I.O.P. 5.7. 
17 The Dissent says that the fact Moody was not entitled 
to any work, and hence not entitled to any benefits, means that 
she could not experience a change to her benefits.  This implies 
that Moody would not be protected from sexual harassment no 
matter who was her supervisor.  The law, however, protects 
workers from sexual harassment.  Thus, while Moody was not 
guaranteed any work hours, and by extension had no 
guaranteed benefits, she, like other hourly workers covered by 
Title VII and the NJLAD, is guaranteed to be protected from 
sexual harassment by her supervisor.   
18 As is apparent, the Majority has not ignored Vance 
but in fact heeded its instructions.  Moreover, even under the 
Dissent’s articulation of Vance’s requirements, the outcome is 
the same: Marshall was Moody’s supervisor.  The Dissent 
poses one of Vance’s considerations for determining whether 
a person is a supervisor as follows: “Could Marshall . . . make 
a decision that caused a significant change in [Moody’s] 
benefits?”  Dissent at 6.  The answer to this question is 
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B 
 
 The Board argues that, even if Marshall was Moody’s 
supervisor and he harassed her, it would not be liable for his 
conduct pursuant to the Ellerth/Faragher defense.  An 
employer can establish an affirmative defense to liability for a 
supervisor’s creation of a hostile work environment by 
showing “(1) that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
promptly correct any harassing behavior and (2) that the 
plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any 
                                              
unequivocally yes.  Marshall had the authority from the Board 
to determine whether Moody worked at all at New York 
Avenue School and this authority was not vague or “ill-
defined.”  Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443.   
Moreover, contrary to the Dissent’s characterization, 
the Majority is not simply relying on the fact that Marshall 
could assign Moody work hours.  Marshall was not a mere 
scheduler, assigning hours among those who were in a pool of 
employees.  Marshall controlled whether Moody worked at 
New York Avenue School at all.  Furthermore, the record does 
not reflect that anyone else was Moody’s supervisor.  The 
Dissent challenges this statement by citing to Moody’s 
deposition testimony where she was asked whether she 
discussed Marshall’s behavior with anyone such as the 
principal or Marshall’s supervisor.  This exchange, however, 
does not indicate that either of these people supervised her 
pursuant to Vance.  Moreover, while the Dissent suggests that 
those who hired Moody qualify as her supervisors under 
Vance, even if that were so, this does not mean Marshall was 
not also her supervisor. 
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preventive or corrective opportunities that were provided.”  
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2442 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765).  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(c), “[i]n responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any . . . affirmative defense.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 8(c)(1); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (describing the 
defense as an “affirmative defense” and citing to Rule 8(c)).  
“An affirmative defense which is neither pleaded as required 
by [R]ule 8(c) nor made the subject of an appropriate motion 
under [R]ule 12(b) is waived.”  Sys. Inc. v. Bridge Elecs. Co., 
335 F.2d 465, 466 (3d Cir. 1964).  However, an affirmative 
defense generally “need not be articulated with any rigorous 
degree of specificity, and is sufficiently raised for purposes of 
[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 by its bare assertion.” 
Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 
1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  While 
the Board’s answer did not explicitly identify the 
Ellerth/Faragher defense, the answer states that the Board “at 
all times, acted in good faith and based on reasonable and 
rational decision-making and procedure delegated to it under 
the laws of the State of New Jersey.”  Def. App. 60.  This 
statement is sufficient to raise the assertion that the Board acted 
with “reasonable care” under the first prong of the 
Ellerth/Faragher analysis regarding promptly taking corrective 
action.  The Board’s answer also states that Moody’s damages 
were barred by her “failure to mitigate.”  Def. App. 60.  Under 
the second prong of the Ellerth/Faragher analysis, a plaintiff’s 
failure to take advantage of preventative or corrective 
opportunities at a school could be characterized as a “failure to 
mitigate” damages.  See Adams v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C., 754 
F.3d 1240, 1258 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that pleading of 
“failure to mitigate” sufficiently raised an Ellerth/Faragher 
defense).  Accordingly, while it would have been better to more 
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explicitly assert the Ellerth/Faragher defense, the Board’s 
answer provides sufficient notice of its intent to raise it.  See 
Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134-35 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“The purpose of requiring the defendant to plead available 
affirmative defenses in [its] answer is to avoid surprise and 
undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice and the 
opportunity to demonstrate why the affirmative defense should 
not succeed.”).   
 
 The Board’s brief in support of its motion for summary 
judgment also alludes to the Ellerth/Faragher defense, even 
though it is not mentioned by name.  Its brief emphasizes that 
Moody did not report the harassment until February 4, 2013, 
and the Board immediately took action and conducted a 
thorough investigation upon receiving her complaint.  These 
arguments address the Ellerth/Faragher analysis by claiming 
that Moody failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities 
when she did not timely report the harassment, and asserting 
that the Board acted reasonably by immediately conducting a 
thorough investigation into Moody’s complaint.  Therefore, the 
Board did not waive its Ellerth/Faragher defense. 
 
 The Ellerth/Faragher defense, however, is available 
only where the plaintiff did not experience a “tangible 
employment action.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.  Moody argues 
that she experienced a tangible employment action by 
receiving reduced hours from Marshall.  There are many ways 
Moody’s work hours could be viewed.  For example, Moody 
worked more hours for Marshall in the three pay periods before 
she rejected his advances than in the three pay periods after she 
rejected them.  Compare App. 156, 159, 162 (showing that 
Moody worked a total of 94 hours at New York Avenue School 
in the pay periods of November 19-30, December 3-14, and 
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December 17-28), with App. 165, 168, 171 (showing that 
Moody worked a total of 62.5 hours at New York Avenue 
School in the pay periods of December 31-January 11, January 
14-25, and January 28-February 8).  A reasonable juror could 
conclude that Marshall gave Moody hours to entice her to 
accede to his sexual demands and then reduced her hours after 
she rejected him.  On the other hand, Moody received about 
the same number of hours at New York Avenue School in 
January 2013, after she rejected Marshall, as she did in 
December 2012, before she rejected Marshall.  Compare App. 
156, 159, 162, 165 (showing that Moody worked a total of 54.5 
hours at New York Avenue School in December 2012), with 
App. 165, 168, 171 (showing that Moody worked a total of 56 
hours at New York Avenue School in January 2013).  A 
reasonable juror could therefore also conclude that Marshall 
did not reduce Moody’s hours at all following her rejection of 
his advances.  Because Moody’s pay records are central to the 
question of whether she suffered a tangible employment action 
and could reasonably be viewed in two ways, there is a 
disputed issue of material fact as to whether she suffered a 
tangible employment action.  Because the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense is available only where there is no tangible 
employment action, Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, a jury must first 
decide whether there was such an action.  If the jury concludes 
that there was not, the District Court or jury (if there are 
disputed material facts with respect to the Ellerth/Faragher 
defense) may then decide whether the Board avoids liability 
based on the defense.  Because there are disputed facts 
concerning whether Marshall took a tangible employment 
action against Moody, and the answer to that question dictates 
whether the Board may invoke the Ellerth/Faragher defense, 
we will vacate the District Court’s order granting summary 
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judgment in the Board’s favor on Moody’s hostile work 
environment claim.    
 
IV 
 
 Title VII and the NJLAD make it unlawful for an 
employer to retaliate against an employee who complains 
about employment discrimination.19  To establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show “(1) 
[that she engaged in] protected employee activity; (2) adverse 
action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with 
the employee’s protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s 
adverse action.”  Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 
193 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); Craig v. Suburban Cablevision, Inc., 660 A.2d 505, 
508 (N.J. 1995) (reciting similar elements for NJLAD 
retaliation).   
 
 As to the first element of the prima facie case, Moody 
filed a written complaint about Marshall’s alleged sexual 
                                              
19 Title VII makes it unlawful “for an employer to 
discriminate against any of [its] employees . . . because [the 
employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
employment practice by this subchapter, or because [the 
employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or 
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).  
Similarly, under the NJLAD, it is unlawful “[f]or any person 
to take reprisals against any person because that person has 
opposed any practices or acts forbidden under this act.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(d). 
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harassment with the Board on February 4, 2013, and the Board 
concedes that this action constitutes an “activity protected by 
Title VII.”  App. 56; see Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193 (noting that 
protected activity includes “informal protests of discriminatory 
employment practices, including making complaints to 
management” (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).     
 
 As to the second element, we must determine whether 
Moody suffered a materially adverse action.  In this context, a 
materially adverse action is one that would have “dissuaded a 
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”  Id. at 195 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Here, after Moody filed her February 2013 
complaint of sexual harassment, she experienced a drop in the 
hours she was assigned.  In the four months preceding her 
complaint, Moody worked a total of 360 hours.  See App. 181-
82 (showing that Moody was assigned to work 62 hours in 
October 2012, 115.5 hours in November 2012, 126.5 hours in 
December 2012, and 56 hours in January 2013).  By 
comparison, in the four months following her complaint, 
Moody worked a total of 115.5 hours.  See App. 182 (showing 
that Moody was assigned to work 36 hours in February 2013, 
23 hours in March 2013, 32.5 hours in April 2013, and 24 hours 
in May 2013).  Therefore, Moody’s working hours declined 
three-fold in the months following her complaint as compared 
to the months preceding her complaint.  Viewing these facts in 
a light most favorable to the non-movant, a reasonable 
employee could view this reduction of work hours, and the 
resulting decreased pay, as sufficient to discourage him or her 
from filing a sexual harassment complaint.  Therefore, Moody 
satisfies the second element of the prima facie case. 
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 Finally, as to whether there is a causal connection 
between the plaintiff’s protected activity and the employer’s 
adverse action, a court considers a “broad array of evidence,” 
including whether there is an “unusually suggestive” temporal 
proximity between the protected activity and adverse action.  
Daniels, 776 F.3d at 196 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  An inference of “unduly suggestive” temporal 
proximity begins to dissipate where there is a gap of three 
months or more between the protected activity and the adverse 
action.  LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 
F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007).  In this case, as noted above, 
Moody’s working hours declined immediately following the 
filing of her complaint and never recovered.  In fact, in the two 
pay periods directly following the filing of her complaint, 
Moody was not assigned any hours.  See App. 173-77 
(showing no hours worked for Moody during the pay periods 
of February 11-22 and February 25-March 8).  The close 
temporal connection between Moody’s complaint and the 
reduction in her hours is “unduly suggestive” and sufficient to 
provide prima facie evidence of a causal connection.  
 
 Accordingly, Moody has established a prima facie case 
of retaliation under Title VII and the NJLAD.20 
                                              
20 While there may be a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the reduction in Moody’s hours, neither the parties 
nor the District Court addressed it because the District Court 
concluded that Moody did not establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  See Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193 (stating that after the 
plaintiff makes out her prima facie case, “the burden of 
production of evidence shifts to the employer to present a 
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the adverse 
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V 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings.  
                                              
action”).  The District Court may address this issue on remand, 
and we express no opinion on its proper resolution.  
Michelle Moody v. Atlantic City Board of Education 
 
 No. 16-4373 
 
          
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
 Four years ago in Vance v. Ball State University, 133 
S. Ct. 2434 (2013), the Supreme Court set forth a clear and 
straightforward test for determining whether an employee 
ought to be considered a “supervisor” for purposes of the 
employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment in the 
workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).  The Majority’s decision to deem 
Marshall a “supervisor” and allow Moody’s hostile work 
environment claim to move forward totally ignores, and is 
inconsistent with, this recent pronouncement.  For that reason, 
I respectfully dissent.1    
  
I. “Supervisor” Before Vance 
 The Supreme Court first attached significance to the 
“supervisor” label in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775 (1998).  In those cases, the Supreme Court held 
that an employer will be held vicariously liable for its 
employees who engage in discrimination such as sexual 
                                              
1 I do not take issue with the Majority’s judgment on 
Moody’s retaliation claim.  
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harassment, even in the absence of negligence, if the harasser 
was a “supervisor” who took a “tangible employment action” 
against the victim.  See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762; Faragher, 
524 U.S. at 790.  These cases defined a “tangible employment 
action” as a “significant change in employment status, such as 
hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a 
significant change in benefits.”  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.  
They explained that “[a] tangible employment decision 
requires an official act of the enterprise, a company act[,]” 
which “in most cases is documented in official company 
records, and may be subject to review by higher level 
supervisors.”  Id. at 762.   
 
 Although Ellerth and Faragher confirmed the 
significance of supervisor status for Title VII claims, they left 
the term “supervisor” undefined.2  This lack of guidance led 
to a circuit split.  Some courts interpreted the case law to 
“presuppose[] a clear distinction between supervisors and co-
workers” that focused on such discrete responsibilities as 
hiring/firing, promoting/demoting, transferring, and 
disciplining, while others followed the “open-ended approach 
advocated by the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance, which 
tie[d] supervisor status to the ability to exercise significant 
                                              
2 In both Ellerth and Faragher, the status of the alleged 
harasser was not in dispute and so the Supreme Court did not 
need to reason through this issue.  See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 
2447 (“In light of the parties’ undisputed characterization of 
the alleged harassers, this Court simply was not presented 
with the question of the degree of authority that an employee 
must have in order to be classified as a supervisor.”). 
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direction over another’s daily work.”  See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 
2443 (contrasting the former approach taken by the First, 
Seventh, and Eighth circuits with the latter approach taken by 
the Second and Fourth circuits).  The EEOC’s Enforcement 
Guidance set forth vague qualitative and quantitative 
guidelines:  
 
[A]n employee, in order to be classified as a 
supervisor, must wield authority of sufficient 
magnitude so as to assist the harasser explicitly 
or implicitly in carrying out the harassment. . . . 
[T]he authority must exceed both an ill-defined 
temporal requirement (it must be more than 
occasiona[l]) and an ill-defined substantive 
requirement (an employee who directs only a 
limited number of tasks or assignments for 
another employee . . . would not have sufficient 
authority to qualify as a supervisor.[)].   
 
Id. at 2449 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(third alteration in original).  Courts adopting the EEOC’s 
Enforcement Guidance thus considered “the number (and 
perhaps the importance) of the tasks in question [as] a factor 
to be considered in determining whether an employee 
qualifies as a supervisor.”  Id. at 2450.  In Vance, the 
Supreme Court noted that this approach resulted in a 
“standard of remarkable ambiguity” given that “[k]ey 
components of that standard—‘sufficient’ authority, authority 
to assign more than a ‘limited number of tasks,’ and authority 
that is exercised more than ‘occasionally’—have no clear 
meaning.”  Id. 
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 Prompted by the deepening divide among the circuits 
and the myriad variations that the label “supervisor” had 
come to connote depending on the context,3 Vance finally 
addressed the “supervisor” question.   
 
II.  Vance v. Ball State University 
 Writing for the majority in Vance, Justice Alito made 
it quite clear that the Supreme Court was announcing a new, 
“readily applied” test for determining whether one is a 
“supervisor” for purposes of hostile work environment claims 
brought under Title VII.  Id. at 2449.  The case marked a shift 
in analysis away from the “nebulous definition,” id. at 2443, 
or “study in ambiguity,” id. at 2449, that had previously 
applied.  No longer is there an assortment of “varying 
meanings” that can be considered, id. at 2446, or “a highly 
                                              
3 See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2444 (“A comparison of the 
definitions provided by two colloquial business authorities 
illustrates the term’s imprecision in general usage.  One says 
that ‘[s]upervisors are usually authorized to recommend 
and/or effect hiring, disciplining, promoting, punishing, 
rewarding, and other associated activities regarding the 
employees in their departments.’  Another says exactly the 
opposite:  ‘A supervisor generally does not have the power to 
hire or fire employees or to promote them.’ . . . If we look 
beyond general usage to the meaning of the term in other 
legal contexts, we find much the same situation.  Sometimes 
the term is reserved for those in the upper echelons of the 
management hierarchy. . . . But sometimes the term is used to 
refer to lower[-]ranking individuals.”) (citation and footnotes 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
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case-specific evaluation of numerous factors” in which courts 
ought to engage, id. at 2443.  Rather, the newly streamlined 
test is whether the person in question has the authority—
“empowered by the employer”—to alter the employee’s 
status.  Id. at 2439.  Courts are now charged with asking 
whether the employee in question is capable of taking one of 
several discrete actions toward the employee:  Can that 
person hire or fire the employee?  Can that person promote or 
demote the employee?  Can that person reassign the employee 
with significantly different responsibilities or make a decision 
that causes a significant change in the employee’s benefits?  
If none of these questions can “readily” be answered in the 
affirmative, then the inquiry ends and the reviewing court 
may not deem that employee a “supervisor.”  This bright-line 
approach fosters an “easily workable” definition that “can be 
applied without undue difficulty at both the summary 
judgment stage and at trial.”  Id. at 2444 (also observing that 
“[t]he alternative, in many cases, would frustrate judges and 
confound jurors”).4   
                                              
4 Clarifying Ellerth and Faragher, Justice Alito stated: 
Those decisions contemplate a unitary category 
of supervisors, i.e., those employees with the 
authority to make tangible employment 
decisions.  There is no hint in either decision 
that the Court had in mind two categories of 
supervisors:  first, those who have such 
authority and, second, those who, although 
lacking this power, nevertheless have the ability 
to direct a co-worker’s labor to some ill-defined 
degree.  On the contrary, the Ellerth/Faragher 
framework is one under which supervisory 
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III.  Marshall Is Not a “Supervisor” Under Vance 
 Turning to our case, I would have applied the 
unambiguous test that Vance established rather than the 
Majority’s open-ended, multi-factor approach that Vance 
explicitly rejected.  Could Marshall hire or fire Moody?  
Could Marshall promote or demote Moody?  Could Marshall 
reassign Moody with significantly different responsibilities or 
make a decision that caused a significant change in her 
benefits?  The record undoubtedly answers all of these 
questions in the negative.   
 
 The Majority primarily argues that Marshall was 
Moody’s “supervisor” because he could cause a significant 
change in Moody’s benefits by virtue of his ability to assign 
her hours and his record of assigning her a significant number 
of hours.  The Majority relatedly urges that Marshall’s 
supervisory status also stems from his ability “to determine 
whether Moody worked at all” at the New York Avenue 
School.  Maj. Op. at 18.  But as the record and relevant case 
                                                                                                     
status can usually be readily determined, 
generally by written documentation.  
Id. at 2443.  Ellerth held that “[t]angible employment actions 
are the means by which the supervisor brings the official 
power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates.”  524 U.S. at 
762.  Elucidating this statement, Vance rejected the “open-
ended approach” and held that “[t]he strong implication of 
this passage is that the authority to take tangible employment 
actions is the defining characteristic of a supervisor, not 
simply a characteristic of a subset of an ill-defined class of 
employees who qualify as supervisors.”  133 S. Ct. at 2448.   
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law demonstrate, neither characterization of Marshall’s 
responsibilities is enough to render Marshall a “supervisor” 
under Vance.  I will address each one in turn. 
 
A. 
 The Majority contends that because Marshall impacted 
Moody’s “benefits”—i.e., her pay by virtue of giving, or not 
giving, work—he was her “supervisor.”  Id.  Due to the 
number of hours he assigned her (and then ultimately did not 
assign her), the argument goes, this impact was “significant” 
so as to make Marshall’s assignment of work fit within the 
last phrase of the Ellerth description of tangible employment 
actions—a decision that causes a “significant change in 
benefits.”  Id. at 17 (citation omitted); see also id. at 18 
(“Marshall assigned Moody over 70% of her hours from 
October 2012 through February 2013”).  This contention, and 
the approach it rests on, squarely contradicts Vance, as 
Moody was not entitled to any “benefits” that could be 
“change[d].”   
 
 The Majority rightly notes that as a substitute 
custodian, Moody “was not guaranteed any work.”  Id. at 3.  
Moody well understood what her position entailed, as she 
testified in her deposition that she was never entitled to a 
minimum number of days of work per week, fixed tenure, 
raise in salary, promotion to full-time custodian, or any 
additional benefits.  (See A. 206–09.)  Indeed, when she 
wanted more assignments, Moody knew she needed to take 
the initiative to introduce herself to the foremen and make it 
known that she was available.   Moody’s arrangement with 
the Board is dispositive of the supervisor question, as the 
benefits to which she was entitled constitute our starting point 
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for assessing whether there was a “significant change.”  But 
as Moody testified, there were no benefits to which she was 
entitled. 
 
 “Significant change in benefits,” placed as it is in 
Ellerth as the last phrase following such discrete capabilities 
as hiring and firing, see 524 U.S. at 761, must involve a 
change in some specific aspect of employment that has 
already been contracted for or is reasonably expected, such as 
take-home pay, vacation days, health coverage, and the like.  
Moody was not entitled to, nor had any expectation of, any of 
these types of benefits, and Marshall did not have any 
authority to provide them, let alone alter them.  While he 
could assign her work, as could the other ten foremen, Vance 
rejected that capability as part of a nebulous supervisor 
calculus.  See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2445–46 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 
9701.212(b)(4) as an example that in some legal contexts, 
“supervisory work . . . may involve hiring or selecting 
employees” and “assigning work,” and noting that “the term 
‘supervisor’ has varying meanings both in colloquial usage 
and in the law” and that therefore a streamlined definition 
was necessary for Title VII purposes).   
 
 Furthermore, if impacting pay by giving or not giving 
work elevates an employee to supervisor status, every person 
in charge of the weekly roster for hourly workers such as 
waiters, nurses, truckers, and the like will be supervisors if 
they sufficiently favor, or disfavor, certain of those workers.  
And such a purported “supervisor” would not be a 
“supervisor” of those employees whose hours were not 
significantly impacted.  The analysis espoused by the 
Majority today would have courts engage in a rigorous fact-
checking of payroll records and then not only calculate the 
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total number of hours worked but also identify and contrast 
patterns of those hours over time and among employees.5  
Such an undertaking is precisely the sort of “highly case-
specific evaluation” that Vance eliminated.  Even if we were 
permitted to engage in that sort of inquiry, the Majority’s 
conclusion would still be erroneous because Marshall’s 
responsibilities do not take on greater weight—and, by 
extension, do not render him a “supervisor”—simply because 
Moody happened to be more successful with him than with 
other foremen in securing work.  Marshall’s responsibilities 
are defined at the front-end by the terms set by the employer, 
which in this case, simply did not task Marshall with a 
supervisory role as contemplated by Vance. 
 
 Marshall’s assignment of hours, and its impact on 
Moody’s pay, is only noteworthy because Moody was a wage 
employee and not a salaried one.  The few courts of appeals 
to address the “supervisor” question have noted this 
distinction—wage employee as opposed to salaried—but then 
have rejected the idea that influencing hours and pay in this 
                                              
5 The Majority aims to downplay its rigorous examination 
of the record (and, more specifically, its reliance on the 
payroll records), by stating that it is “simply using the records 
to corroborate the conclusion that Marshall controlled a 
sizeable amount of Moody’s work, and hence her 
compensation—the benefit she received from her 
employment.”  Maj. Op. at 18 n.15.  This understatement is 
puzzling, as the Majority’s conclusion that the impact of 
Marshall’s assignments on Moody’s take-home pay rendered 
him a “supervisor” is necessarily drawn from and dependent 
on an analysis of these very records.   
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way could render an employee a “supervisor.”  See EEOC v. 
Autozone, Inc., No. 16-6387, 2017 WL 2506526, at *2–3 (6th 
Cir. June 9, 2017) (implying that victim was an hourly 
employee but still finding that harasser was not her 
“supervisor” because he could not fire, demote, promote, or 
transfer, and noting that “Vance establishes a sharp line 
between co-workers and supervisors, not an invitation for 
speculation about amorphous levels of influence”) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); Chavez-Acosta v. Sw. 
Cheese Co., LLC, 610 F. App’x 722, 730 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that an employee was not a “supervisor” because he 
could not effect “significant change” in the victim’s 
employment even though he was a “team leader” in the 
department in which the victim worked and even though the 
victim was an hourly employee); McCafferty v. Preiss 
Enters., Inc., 534 F. App’x 726, 728, 731 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(finding no “supervisor” status for an employee who oversaw 
and assigned work to McDonald’s crewmembers and noting 
that “[i]f mere influence in tangible employment decisions 
rendered a co-worker a supervisor, this exception would 
swallow the rule”). 
 
 Other courts of appeals have likewise found supervisor 
status to be lacking when reviewing responsibilities similar to 
those assigned to Marshall.  See Kim v. Coach, Inc., No. 14-
16248, 2017 WL 2615457, at *1 (9th Cir. June 16, 2017) 
(finding no supervisor status for employee who could give 
instructions about work); Matherne v. Ruba Mgmt., 624 F. 
App’x 835, 840 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding no supervisor status 
for employee who had some leadership authority, including 
control over a book where managers would make comments 
if anything went wrong in the workplace, but could not hire, 
fire, promote, demote, transfer, or discipline); Spencer v. 
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Schmidt Elec. Co., 576 F. App’x 442, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(finding no supervisor status for employee who could give 
other employees direction on how to do their jobs but could 
not fire anyone without permission, and noting that “evidence 
. . . that a foreman was authorized to direct the employee’s 
daily work activities . . . is the definition of supervisor 
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Conversely, courts have found that an 
employee qualifies as a supervisor when empowered to take 
the sorts of actions that Marshall could not.   See Voltz v. Erie 
Cty., 617 F. App’x 417, 424 (6th Cir. 2015) (employee who 
could interview and hire candidates, determine salary 
increases, and make recommendations regarding employee 
terminations was a “supervisor”).  The only case that the 
Majority cites to support its elastic definition of “supervisor” 
as encompassing reducing another’s hours, Cotton v. Cracker 
Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 434 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 
2006), was decided over seven years before Vance and 
focused on “highly case-specific” factors that Vance 
explicitly rejected.  See Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2443 (rejecting 
the notion that one who “ha[s] the ability to direct a co-
worker’s labor to some ill-defined degree” may properly be 
considered a “supervisor”).   
 
B. 
 The Majority relatedly contends that Marshall had the 
authority to determine “whether Moody worked at all” at the 
New York Avenue School.  Maj. Op. at 18.  Relying solely 
on Cotton, this line of argument urges that “Marshall had the 
authority to cause a significant change in benefits by 
assigning her no hours, thereby eliminating her take-home 
pay.”  Id.  But such a characterization, insinuating that 
12 
 
Moody’s fate as a Board employee was entirely up to 
Marshall, blatantly ignores the fact that Marshall had no 
control whatsoever over Moody’s ability to work at the ten 
other schools, and that she was only prohibited from working 
at the New York Avenue School after other Board employees 
told her to have no further contact with Marshall following 
her internal complaint.   
 
Seeking to portray Marshall as the ultimate decision-
maker of Moody’s work status, the Majority states that “no 
one else was identified in the record as having authority over 
Moody, other than the custodial foremen who could assign 
her work at their schools.”  Id.  Such a gap in the record 
would prove nothing regarding Marshall’s authority over 
Moody—the issue dispositive to Moody’s hostile work 
environment claim.  This description of the record is also 
wrong.  For example, Moody’s deposition indicates the 
presence of at least one other Board employee at the New 
York Avenue School whose authority over her was superior 
to Marshall’s.  Moody testified to the effect that Marshall was 
not in charge at the New York Avenue School during the time 
that Moody worked there.  The relevant exchange occurred 
during questioning regarding Moody’s description of 
Marshall grabbing her in a school stairwell to kiss her: 
 
Q.  Did you discuss your discomfort with          
anyone? 
A.  No. 
Q.  So you didn’t tell the building supervisor, 
like the building principal? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Mr. Marshall’s supervisor? 
A.  No. 
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Q.  How about the police? 
A.  No.  
 
(A. 212 (emphasis added).)  This exchange suggests that there 
was someone else stationed at the New York Avenue School 
to whom Moody reported and who had supervisory authority 
over her.  The record also identifies the Board employees who 
hired Moody and who therefore were her supervisors under 
Vance.6   These examples from the record seriously 
undermine the Majority’s notion that “no one else” had 
“authority over Moody.”  
 
 The Majority’s reasoning further suffers from the 
absence of any limiting principle that the Supreme Court in 
Vance was so determined to impose in employment cases like 
this one.  The Majority reasons on the one hand that 
Marshall’s ability to put together Moody’s schedule at the 
New York Avenue School rendered him her “supervisor” and, 
on the other hand, that “not . . . every employee tasked with 
creating a work schedule is a supervisor for Title VII . . . 
purposes.”  Maj. Op. at 19 n.16.  But the Majority fails to 
explain—let alone cite any supporting legal authority—why 
we ought to set aside the dictates of Vance and find that 
“creating a work schedule” is sufficient in this case.  This 
omission is particularly glaring because the three other factors 
relied upon by the Majority—the Board’s so-called 
                                              
6 Though the Majority emphasizes that Vance did not 
preclude the possibility of multiple supervisors, that lack of 
explicit preclusion says nothing about whether Marshall 
himself enjoyed supervisory power over Moody. 
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“concession” of Marshall’s status;7 the record’s “failure” to 
identify an alternative supervisor; and the Majority’s analysis 
of Moody’s payroll records—do not make the case for 
deeming Marshall a “supervisor.” 
 
All Marshall could do vis-à-vis Moody was schedule 
her hours at one out of the eleven schools at which she was 
qualified to work.  If that alone, as the Majority concedes, is 
insufficient to render an employee a “supervisor,” how can 
Marshall possibly be Moody’s “supervisor” as defined by 
Vance?  The gloss that the Majority seeks to put on 
Marshall’s (limited) responsibilities is wholly belied by the 
facts of the record and the requirements of the law. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Whether or not we agree with the narrowed definition 
of “supervisor” set forth in Vance that will necessarily 
eliminate some employees’ claims against employers for 
hostile or harassing conduct, we are bound to follow the 
Supreme Court’s renunciation of the idea that one who 
assigns work is a supervisor: 
 
Particularly in modern organizations that have 
abandoned a highly hierarchical management 
structure, it is common for employees to have 
overlapping authority with respect to the 
                                              
7 The Board’s remark during oral argument that Marshall 
was acting in a supervisory capacity when Moody worked at 
the New York Avenue School only evinces the Board’s own 
misunderstanding of the concept of “supervisor.”   
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assignment of work tasks.  Members of a team 
may each have the responsibility for taking the 
lead with respect to a particular aspect of the 
work and thus may have the responsibility to 
direct each other in that area of responsibility.   
 
Vance, 133 S. Ct. at 2452.  In making this statement, Vance 
was responding to—and rejecting—the dissenting justices’ 
observation, now adopted by the Majority in this case, that 
“individuals with the power to assign daily tasks are often 
regarded by other employees as supervisors.”  Id.  Even if that 
perception exists, it is not the law for purposes of Title VII.  
The Supreme Court has now held that the responsibility to 
direct others does not make an employee a “supervisor,” and 
this ruling dictates that Marshall was not Moody’s 
“supervisor.”8 
 
 Our limited role for purposes of this appeal is not to 
figure out precisely who at the Board had supervisory power 
over Moody.  We need only address whether Marshall did in 
                                              
8 I echo Justice Alito’s remark in Vance that victims of 
sexual harassment perpetrated by employees not considered 
“supervisors” may still pursue other related claims under Title 
VII, including negligence and quid pro quo (a claim that 
Moody’s counsel inexplicably dropped at oral argument).  See 
133 S. Ct. at 2452.  The Majority’s conclusion that my 
application of Vance to Moody’s claim would preclude 
similarly situated employees from protection against sexual 
harassment is a reformulation of an argument raised by the 
dissenting justices in Vance—and quickly rejected by the 
majority in that case.  See id. at 2451. 
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order to allow Moody’s hostile work environment claim to 
proceed.  It is clear to me, with Vance as binding precedent, 
that he did not.  The Majority’s conclusion to the contrary is 
simply incorrect.   
